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Recently, several behavioral sciences became increasingly interested in investigating
biological and evolutionary foundations of (human) social behavior. In this light, prosocial
behavior is seen as a core element of human nature. A central role within this perspective
plays the “social brain” that is not only able to communicate with the environment but
rather to interact directly with other brains via neuronal mind reading capacities such as
empathy. From the perspective of a sociologist, this paper investigates what “social”
means in contemporary behavioral and particularly brain sciences. It will be discussed
what “social” means in the light of social neuroscience and a glance into the history
of social psychology and the brain sciences will show that two thought traditions come
together in social neuroscience, combining an individualistic and an evolutionary notion
of the “social.” The paper concludes by situating current research on prosocial behavior
in broader social discourses about sociality and society, suggesting that to naturalize
prosocial aspects in human life is a current trend in today’s behavioral sciences and
beyond.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, several behavioral sciences, for instance neuroeco-
nomics (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), primatology (e.g., De
Waal, 2009) and social neuroscience (e.g., Frith and Frith, 2010),
became increasingly interested in investigating biological and
evolutionary foundations of (human) social behavior. Scholars
from these fields argue that the biology of humans is itself much
more prosocial than previously thought. Prosocial behavior is a
core element of human nature. It is rooted in each individual, has
evolved during the course of evolution, is located in the brain, its
genes, functions, hormones and neurotransmitters and is embed-
ded in an environment. A central concept of this new perspective
on human nature is the “social brain” (Brothers, 1990) that is
not only able to communicate with the environment but rather
to interact directly with other brains via neuronal mind reading
capacities such as empathy (see Young, 2012a).
Taking social neuroscience as an example, this paper explores
the notion of “social” in contemporary behavioral sciences and
how a new concept of human nature emerges. At the core of this
new concept is the notion that default human behavior is proso-
cial. The paper sets out to investigate what “social”means in social
neuroscience. (1), the research field is introduced before a glance
in the history of the social sciences shows that “social” is by no
means an unambiguous term (2). The historical roots of the social
brain are explored (3) and the paper concludes (4) by situating
current research on social behavior in broader discourses about
sociality and society, suggesting that the trend to look for proso-
cial aspects in human life, culture and society also takes place in
other spheres of society.
WHAT IS SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE?
Social neuroscience is much more diverse than this brief perspec-
tive paper could picture and hence this paper’s aim can only be
to outline general trends within the field. The term “social neu-
roscience” was first coined by social psychologists Gary Berntson
and John Cacioppo in 1992 (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1992). They
propose a cooperation between social psychology and neuro-
science in order to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism by adding
multiple perspectives to given problems. But it took another
decade before a field with research groups, professorships, uni-
versity courses, textbooks, conferences, societies, and journals
emerged that calls itself social neuroscience (Matusall et al., 2011).
In this process, a second important impetus came from a paper
by Ochsner and Lieberman (2001), who should also be named
among the founding figures of the field.
Many of social neuroscience’s topics of interest fall into the
realm of classic social psychology, for instance the study attitudes,
prejudices and stereotypes (Matusall, 2012). Interestingly, how-
ever, is the field’s new focus on emotion, empathy and altruism
(cf. Decety and Ickes, 2009; Singer and Lamm, 2009). Recently,
prosocial behavior moved into the center of attention, not only
in social neuroscience but also in other behavioral sciences such
as primatology and anthropology (cf. De Waal, 2009; Tomasello,
2009).
WHAT DOES SOCIAL MEAN IN SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCES?
In social neuroscience, prosocial behavior is sought in genes,
brains and evolutionary past. “Social” is simultaneously under-
stood as a capacity of the organism’s brain to cope with the
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environment and as an evolutionary advantage of the species.
This perspective on the social differs fundamentally from soci-
ology’s perspective, where the social can be anything from the
sum of individual actions to power relations or social structures.
The list of phenomena having been defined to be social in the
course of the history of the social sciences is rather long and
diverse as (Greenwood, 1997, p. 3) points out by giving a ran-
dom collection of those phenomena: “states, families, armies,
religious organizations, literary societies, mobs, street brawls,
people chatting on a street corner, the Roman Catholic Church,
the Renaissance, insect communication, dominance hierarchies
among primates, language, financial instruments, and traffic flow
in a city.” Thus, “social” is by no means an unambiguous term
and for understanding social neuroscience’s notion of “social,”
it is crucial to look into the history of experimental social psy-
chology, which is one of social neuroscience’s intellectual par-
ent disciplines. Looking at the questions social neuroscientists
tackle in their research, it soon becomes evident that they focus
on the way social stimuli are perceived and processed in the
brain—no matter whether they study empathy, attitudes toward
out-group members or voters’ behavior. This individual-centered
approach may be self-evident for social neuroscientists, yet it is
a historically contingent approach as will be shown in the next
section.
GENEALOGY OF A CONCEPT
The individualistic perspective on the social has a long tradi-
tion in experimental social psychology: since its emergence in
the 1920’s, this discipline has understood itself as a branch of
individual psychology (Allport, 1924), investigating whether and
how the perception and processing of social stimuli differed from
the perception and processing of non-social stimuli. In order to
apply experimental methods to such questions, social psychol-
ogists had to frame their objects of investigation as statistically
measurable. In this process, the social was redefined as a quality of
countable entities. This perspective differed from theories in 19th
century social psychology that connected the social with morality
and religion, respectively with institutionalized power (Danziger,
1997). Moreover, the individualist notion of the social had a cru-
cial role in defining and defending the individualistic American
Way of Life against collectivist notions of society and the individ-
ual (Rose, 1998). The political background of its emergence seems
all but forgotten by those employing this notion of social today as
a variable investigated by experimental methods. Most social neu-
roscientists are trained in social psychology and most positions
are located in psychology departments. Their research questions
and their argumentation stand in the tradition of experimental
social psychology. By relocating the “social” in the individual’s
brain and neurobiology, social neuroscientists are in line with
their predecessors in treating it as an individual capacity.
PERSPECTIVES FROM SOCIOLOGY
Looking with the eyes of a sociologist, investigating problems in
small pieces, such as brain activation, entails the risk of losing
the perspective on the broader picture and taking the small piece
for the whole problem (Star, 1983). The experimental design
of “social” in social neuroscience research requires rendering
research in a quantitative fashion.1 This does not necessarily
imply a reduction of complexity in the stimuli presented but
in the questions asked. If complex issues such as voters’ emo-
tional reactions to election outcomes or empathy with members
of an “out-group” are measured by quantitative tools, it has to
be assumed that complex phenomenona can be split up into
several problems and thus are not more than the sum of their
parts. This approach differs fundamentally from hermeneutic
approaches towards complex phenomena, which are more inter-
ested in meaning than in mechanisms and which are dominant in
humanities and non-quantifying social sciences.
To some extent, social neuroscientists seem to be aware of
this and pay credit to the problem of complexity by drawing on
the notion of levels (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1992; Ochsner and
Lieberman, 2001). Cacioppo and Berntson (1992) maintain that
although the brain is an essential component of all social beings,
brain, behavior and society are each too complex to be reduced
to one another. Hence, social neuroscience aims to combine data
generated on different levels to reach a better comprehension of
social behavior. Yet, knowledge from other disciplines can only
be integrated if compatible with the standards of quantifying sci-
ences and qualitative knowledge is difficult to incorporate in such
paradigms.
HISTORY OF THE SOCIAL BRAIN2
Not only in social psychology, also in the brain sciences, questions
about the “social” have a long tradition. The relationship between
the brain and the social has been an issue of hot debate ever since
the emergence of modern brain science in the late 18th century.
In these debates, the pendulum has been swinging happily back
and forth between seeing either nature or nurture as responsi-
ble for human behavior. Early 19th century’s phrenologists, for
instance, defined a cerebral faculty for each human property and
thus saw a clear causal direction from brain to behavior, while
psychiatrists in the second half of the 19th century made harmful
social conditions responsible for psychiatric disorders and thus
reversed causal directions (Hagner, 2007). Theories of evolution
were central to 19th and early 20th century’s concepts of the brain
and the social. These theories were associated with a hierarchical
organization of brain areas: the younger, more evolved parts such
as intellectual capacities or morality controlled older parts such
as drives and emotions (e.g., Jackson, 1884).
Not least as a reaction to the role medicine and biologi-
cal sciences played in Nazi ideology, after the Second World
War research in the West was dominated by behaviorism, cyber-
netics and cognitive science (Hagner, 2007). During that time
questions about human interactions did not play a role in
mainstream neuroscience and psychology. This began to change
slowly in the 1980’s and with even more force in the 1990’s
1On the potential dangers of the “mereological fallacy”, see Bennett and
Hacker, 2003 and also Krüger, 2010.
2For more detailed historical analyses of discourses on the social brain and
its relationship to society, see the recent work by anthropologist Allan Young:
Young, 2011, 2012a,b. For a philosophical perspective on prosociality in neu-
roeconomics, and particularly a critical examination of the notion of altruistic
punishment, see e.g., Klein, 2012.
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when the social brain returned to the debate in three inde-
pendent theories about the relationship between brain and
social: the social brain hypothesis, the somatic marker hypothesis
and the mirror neuron theory, which will be discussed in next
section.
THE SOCIAL BRAIN SINCE THE 1990’s
The social brain hypothesis suggests that the size of the neocortex
and the group size of mammals living in social groups corre-
late (Brothers, 1990; Dunbar, 1998). The bigger the group, the
more complex the social situations which the brain has to process.
Certain cognitive skills evolved to cope with social complexity.
Consequently, the way we act in social interactions is determined
by evolutionary heritage. The social brain hypothesis does not
explicitly discuss the impact of history, culture, society, or life
experiences on social cognition abilities in an individual or a
group. Only in an evolutionary time frame these factors may have
an impact on how future generations may engage with each other
(Matusall, 2012). Nor does it answer the “hen and egg” question
of whether the complex social groups or the cerebral capacities
for processing them was first; or whether both evolved together.
What it does is providing an evolutionary explanation for both,
human sociality and the species’ big brains.
The second theory, the somatic marker hypothesis was intro-
duced by neuropsychiatrist Antonio Damasio and it suggests that
positive experiences are connected with positive memories leav-
ing a positive somatic marker, i.e., an incentive for deciding in
favor of similar actions in future decision-making processes while
negative experiences are connected with negative memories leav-
ing negative a somatic marker, i.e., an alarm bell, leading to
deciding against similar actions in future decision-making pro-
cesses. These markers are acquired during socialization not only
through experienced events but also by incorporating norms and
rules and can change throughout life if new experiences occur
(Damasio et al., 1991). This means a crucial shift in thinking
about the social and the brain, which is later taken up by social
neurosciences and related disciplines (Cacioppo and Berntson,
2005; Glimcher et al., 2009; Ariely and Berns, 2010). The somatic
marker hypothesis couples biology with cultural and social envi-
ronments. Somatic markers and thus the ability to act socially is
part of the biological make-up with which humans are born, yet
the way this sociality takes shape depends on the particular beliefs
and values of the society one is born into (Damasio, 1994).
Around the same time when Damasio developed his somatic
marker hypothesis, in Italy a team of neuroscientists reported to
have found a neural basis of the capacity of primates to engage
with others (di Pellegrino et al., 1992). It followed an ever-
increasing interest in these neurons, which were soon named mir-
ror neurons, and their hypothesized function included a growing
number of areas of social life (e.g., Gallese, 2003). This theory
did not only seem to explain human social behavior, development
and learning but also how we participate, for example, in another
person’s joy and distress automatically, by biological default. Yet,
after the first excitement faded away, mirror neurons became con-
tested (see for instance Hickok, 2008; Gallese et al., 2011) and
it is too early to decide whether the mirror neuron theory will
become canonical knowledge in the attempt of how mind and
brain work. Like other such theories such as the concept of brain
plasticity, mirror neuron theory enjoys a broad popularity outside
the scientific community—perhaps not least because it provides
a biology based on prosociality. The idea of biologically auto-
matic responses to other people’s behavior and even emotions is
alluring, since it seems to argue in favor of a prosocial default of
human nature. Even though feeling does not automatically lead to
acting, being able to empathize may lay a foundation for prosocial
action.
These three theories and their focus on social aspects of the
human condition differ from preceding notions of human nature
in one fundamental respect: Homo sapiens are understood as a
social and empathic species rather than an individualistic one.
Contrary to older models, it is now suggested that it comes quite
naturally to humans to act prosocially. Evidence for the prosocial
nature of humankind is found in humans’ evolutionary history
and the neurobiological and hormonal substrate of the brain. By
looking at social behavior from this perspective, it appears that
cooperation and altruism are beneficial. Working together, so the
argument goes, made life easier and increased the chances of sur-
vival of the group’s offspring (see e.g., Brothers, 1990 andDunbar,
1998).
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
Evolutionary reasoning about prosociality can be summarized as
follows: since Homo sapiens are a social species, organized in
communities, individuals, who are able to decipher social stimuli
and to act in prosocial ways had better chances of reproduc-
tion and hence, social brains evolved.3 This evolutionary heritage
equips contemporary humans with the tools for coping with the
complexity of social organizations and to engage in social rela-
tionships. Not everyone acts prosocially all the time, but every
healthy person bears in themselves the potential to do so and has
the option to act on that potential. This perspective on sociality
means a shift in the conceptual framework of what it is the norm
and what needs explanation. While protagonists of this new ver-
sion of human nature do not deny that aggression is as much part
of human nature as is empathy, it now becomes marked as the
other, the trait which needs to be explained and this also pro-
vides a new perspective on pathologies such as psychopathy or
autism, which are now defined by their lack of empathy (e.g.,
Baron-Cohen, 2011; Blair, 2011). But not only pathologies, even
everyday behavior such as envy is interpreted in terms of empa-
thy, respectively the lack thereof (e.g., Shamay-Tsoory, 2009). This
does not mean that antisocial behavior is no longer a part of this
paradigm. Yet, it becomes the other, the non-normal, which needs
to be explained.
In social neuroscience, the individualistic notion of social
rooting in American social psychology and the more collectivist
notion of the social rooting in anthropology come together and
thus in this framework, social relations are intelligibly investigated
within the individual. The focus is not on structures, institutions,
3The relationship between prosociality, cooperation, and altruism is complex
and by no means uncontested in evolutionary psychology and other behav-
ioral sciences. For overviews over the debate see e.g., Henrich and Henrich,
2006; Boyd and Richerson, 2009.
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power relations, all things that can potentially be changed, but
on the social as a biological category—nature—that cannot be
changed. Sociality becomes a naturalized, innate quality and thus
every “normal” individual is capable of behaving prosocially. At a
time when responsibility for social cohesion is de-centralized, the
neural capacity for prosociality is found.
NEOSOCIALITY?
Social neuroscience’s notion of social relates to a new notion of
what human beings are and how they normally act, in short a new
version of a biologically based human nature. In this narrative,
sociality is the driving force behind human evolution.
The notion of “social” employed in social neuroscience
research is located in the individual brain, its ability to decode
a certain kind of stimuli and to interact with others. It is a
noteworthy historical concomitance that the investigation of
social interactions via social structures or collective processes
is replaced by the investigation of processes that take place
within individuals at the same time when, in a broader soci-
etal setting, collectivist solutions have been replaced by more
individual solution (e.g., in welfare, see for instance Sennett,
2006; Lessenich, 2008). Rabinow (1999) described this devel-
opment as the transformation towards a “biosociality”—social
structures become less important while identities are more and
more based on individual (i.e., genetic) attributes than on
social or group attributes. Investigating the social via commu-
nal genetic make-up or individuals’ brains is rather different
from studying the external conditions for a social structure.
In this approach, prosocial behavior becomes something innate
and thus every normal individual is capable of behaving
prosocially.
CONCLUSION
Social neuroscience is an interdisciplinary endeavor aiming to
investigate sociality. Taking its methods from social psychology
and cognitive neuroscience and its explanatory frame from evo-
lutionary anthropology, it defines the social as both a feature of
Homo sapiens’ environment and an inherent human capacity to
cope and survive. Doing so, it contributes to a new, prosocial
notion of human nature. The lens through which social behavior
is studied, has changed.
Yet, at the moment, both its focus on quantitative methods and
reservations from many arts and social sciences exclude qualita-
tively operating social science from participating in this endeavor.
A methodological and epistemological openness on both sides
would be desirable because this could really increase knowledge
about social conditions of human nature. Examples for such
openness and collaborations can for instance be found in projects
on “neurofeminism” (Bluhm et al., 2012; Dussauge and Kaiser,
2012; Einstein, 2012; Matusall, in press). These projects exper-
iment with collaborations bridging the gap between qualitative
and quantitative disciplines.
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